I actually found this ruling to be something of a relief, not for what it did but for what it didn't do. And what it didn't do is rule the entire law unconstitutional. In fact, it didn't even halt its implementation, as the plaintiffs had requested. Until now, I had been worried by the lack of a so-called severability clause in the reform legislation--a provision saying that if part of the law should be struck down as unconstitutional, the rest of the law will still stand. I was afraid that a ruling against the individual mandate might necessarily mean all of the law has to go. But the judge who ruled on Monday severed the individual mandate from the rest of the law which demonstrated--much to my relief--that, hey, they can do that. So even if the individual mandate was ultimately struck down by the Supreme Court, they could at least preserve the rest of the law.
But what's really interesting is the treatment of the Necessary and Proper Clause in this ruling, which has come under criticism in some quarters. The Necessary and Proper Clause, of course, is the elastic banding in the underpants of the Constitution, the provision that says: "The Congress shall have Power - To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
What that means is that Congress can indeed do things that aren't explicitly written in the Constitution as long as those things are "necessary and proper" to carrying out one of the enumerated powers. And that isn't just me saying this, here's Madison in Federalist 44:
Had the convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into effect, the attempt would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which the Constitution relates; accommodated too, not only to the existing state of things, but to all the possible changes which futurity may produce; for in every new application of a general power, the particular powers, which are the means of attaining the object of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that object, and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same.
Shorter Madison: "We didn't write down every conceivable power needed in pursuance of the enumerated powers, but they're still in there. Use some common fucking sense, people."
One of the arguments the government used in defending its requirement that almost everyone either carry health insurance or pay a penalty was that this individual mandate is necessary and proper for executing its power to regulate health insurance under the Commerce Clause. This is a reference to the reason the individual mandate exists in the first place. The new law seeks to regulate the individual market for health insurance (i.e. the market in which you buy insurance if you're not getting it through your job) by eliminating unpopular practices like charging sick people higher premiums or even rejecting them entirely if they have a pre-existing condition.
But those practices exist for a reason. If 1) no insurer can turn you away for having a health condition when you want to buy insurance, and 2) that same insurer can't "penalize" you for being sicker than average by making you pay more for your insurance policy, there really isn't much reason to buy insurance if you're healthy. If you choose to go uninsured, you're not taking much of a risk if, should you get sick, insurers can't turn you down or charge you more to punish you for your irresponsibility. Take away the reasons a healthy person would pay for health insurance and lots of them are going to decide to drop out and stop paying premiums until they get sick, at which point they can just sign up again without any hassle. It just makes sense for healthy people to free ride in that situation. That will leave the insurance pools disproportionately full of sicker people and thus increasingly expensive. Bad news. Hence the individual mandate. It steps in to serve the function that was previously being served by medical underwriting. So if you want to regulate underwriting out of existence and you don't want premiums to explode, it seems you have to legislate an individual mandate into existence.
So you can argue that an individual mandate is necessary and proper to regulating the insurance market. And here's where it gets a little odd. At one point the ruling says:
The Commonwealth does not appear to challenge the aggregate effect of the many moving parts of the ACA on interstate commerce. Its lens is narrowly focused on the enforcement mechanism to which it is hinged, the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision.
The Commonwealth argues that the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be employed as a vehicle to enforce an unconstitutional excercise of Commerce Clause power, no matter how well intentioned.
You can see in that first paragraph that Virginia wasn't challenging the federal government's authority to regulate insurance under the Commerce Clause. But then they argue that the Necessary and Proper Clause doesn't apply because, in their minds, it's being "employed as a vehicle to enforce an unconstitutional excercise of Commerce Clause power." Except they've already conceded that the Commerce Clause power being exercised--the regulation of insurance markets to eliminate pre-existing condition exclusions and the like--is constitutional. And since the individual mandate is instituted in furtherance of that power and its aims, one would think the Necessary and Proper Clause would indeed be relevant.
But get this bit of the ruling, where the judge is mulling whether or not to sever the individual mandate from the rest of the law:
Having found a portion of the Act to be invalid, the Section 1501 requirement to maintain minimum essential health care coverage, the Court's next task is to determine whether this Section is severable from the balance of the enactment. Predictably, the Secretary counsels severability, and the Commonwealth urges wholesale invalidation. The Commonwealth's position flows in part from the Secretary's frequent contention that Section 1501 is the linchpin of the entire health care regimen underlying the ACA.
Get that? The anti-reform plaintiffs argued that the whole law should be struck down if the individual mandate is unconstitutional because, of course, they accept that it's a "linchpin of the entire health care regimen." But this is a bit of a Catch-22 for them. As I already noted, they didn't actually challenge the "entire health care regimen." In their laser-like focus on taking down the mandate, they implicitly accepted that the insurance regulations in the law are constitutional. But if they're arguing that the mandate is the "linchpin" needed to make those insurance regulations work, they're making the "necessary and proper" argument. However, if they accept that argument, then the mandate should be valid. Bad news for them. If, on the other hand, they reject that argument (as they did), then there's no reason the individual mandate shouldn't be severable from the rest of the law. Also a bit of a defeat for them.
It's tough to see how they could get everything they want, in a logically consistent fashion, using these arguments.