Celebrated ideas man Rick Perry attempted to bounce back from his "oops" moment this week with the release of a bold--non-999--plan. From the man who brought you the optional flat tax comes the plan to
"Uproot and Overhaul Washington." What caught my eye were his suggestions for "fundamental reform of the legislative branch." Specifically two items:
Part-Time Citizen Congress:
[...]
The U.S. does not need a full-time Congress that is more focused on increasing its perks instead of reducing spending. America needs a part-time, Citizen Congress – populated with those who choose to serve not for profit, or for the promise of a high-paying lobbyist job, but for the good of their communities, states, and the nation. Even with a 50 percent pay-cut, Congressional members would still make a significantly higher income than the average American.11 [...]
Slash Spending for Congressional Staff:
According to the Congressional Research Service, Congress employed more than 15,000 staffers as of 2009.13 In the Senate, the number of staff assigned to senators’ personal offices has more than doubled since 1977; the number of so-called “leadership staff” more than quadrupled over the same time period.14 As the number of staffers grows, so does congressional involvement in nearly every aspect of the American economy.
Why those two in particular? Because they strike me as being an enormous executive power grab.
I can't claim to be well-versed in Texas politics but the
word on the street seems to be that Perry inherited a relatively weak office from his illustrious predecessor and found ways to strengthen it, centralizing power through heretofore untapped channels:
For most of history, Texas has been considered a “weak governor” state. That changed under Perry’s leadership. His lengthy tenure as governor has allowed him to appoint political allies in every single state agency, effectively establishing a Cabinet-style government and giving him vastly more power than any of his predecessors.
And now it seems the governor is setting his sights on accomplishing a similar feat in Washington, D.C.; disconcerting perhaps when you realize we already have a pretty strong federal executive. Aside from the obvious ramifications for executive power of slashing Congressional pay and sending Congress home, the gutting of their staffs is particularly significant. To see why, we need only look back at the overhaul of the modern bureaucratic state that occurred in the first half of the last century, particularly
under FDR. With the balance of bureaucratic expertise (and raw numbers of staff) tipping heavily in the White House's favor, Congress found itself at a distinct disadvantage.
"Congressional procedure," Life magazine was to note in 1945, is largely "the same as it was in 1789." As for the Senate's basic committee and staff structure, that had been established in 1890. During the intervening decades, government had grown enormously--in 1946 the national budget was three hundred times the size it had been in 1890--but the staffs of the Senate committees had grown hardly at all. To oversee that budget, the Senate Appropriations Committee staff consisted of eight persons, exactly one more than had been on that staff decades earlier. Not only were they ridiculously small, the staffs of Senate committees had little of the technical expertise necessary to understand a government which had become infinitely more complicated and technical. The salaries of congressional staff members were so low that Capitol Hill could not attract men and women of the caliber that were flocking to the executive branch.
A study done in 1942 concluded that only four of the seventy-six congressional committees had "expert staffs prepared professionally even to cross-examine experts of the executive branch." As for senators' personal staff, as late as 1941, a senator would be entitled to hire only six employees, and only one at a salary--$3,000--which might attract someone with qualifications above those of a clerk. So little importance was attached to staff that many senators didn't hire even the six to which they were entitled, and an astonishingly high proportion of the approximately 500 employees on senators' personal staffs and the 144 on the staff of the Senate committees were senators' relatives. The Founding Fathers envisioned Congress as a check on the executive. Congress couldn't make even a pretense of analyzing the measures the executive submitted for its approval.
During the decades since 1890, when the Senate had authorized a staff of three persons for its Foreign Relations Committee, the United States had become a global power, with interests in a hundred foreign countries. In 1939, the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was still three: one full-time clerk who took dictation, typed and ran the stenotype machine, and two part-time clerks. As one observer put it, "There could be no adversary relationship between the two branches of government [in foreign relations] because most of the professional work had to be done in the Department of State." Anyone seeking an explanation of the Senate's willingness to allow the rise of the executive agreement, which freed it from the details of foreign policy, need look no further: the Senate simply had no staff adequate to handle the details of foreign policy. The adversary relationship--the relationship that had lain at the heart of the Framers' concept of the American government they thought they were creating--had become impossible in virtually all areas; even Senate Parliamentarian Floyd Riddick had to admit that "with occasional exceptions, Congress did little more than look into, slightly amend or block bills upon which it was called to act."
Unable to analyze legislation, Congress was equally unable to create it.
This was perhaps the most significant alteration in the power of the House and the Senate. The Framers of the Constitution had given Congress great power to make laws, vesting in it "all legislative powers," and during the early, simpler days of the Republic, Congress had jealously guarded that power; as late as 1908, the Senate had erupted in anger when the Secretary of the Interior presumed to send it a bill already drafted in final form. But by the 1930s, with government so much more complicated, bill-drafting had become a science. Knowledge of that science was in extremely short supply on Capitol Hill. There were plenty of legislative technicians with the necessary expertise at the great law firms in New York. There were plenty at the White House, and in the executive departments--the legislative section of the Agriculture Department alone had six hundred employees. In 1939, the Legislative Drafting Service that helped both houses of Congress consisted of eight employees. And of all the scores of major statutes passed during the New Deal, approximately two per year were created by Congress--because, as Tommy Corcoran explained, Congress simply lacked the "technical equipment to draft a big, modern statute."
--Master of the Senate, Robert Caro
Does Perry really want to revert to a time when the legislative branch was so emasculated it didn't have the expertise to even ask executive branch officials to explain themselves?
He seems so stupid but, if only by accident, there's something Johnsonian about him. Stupid like a fox!
P.S. If you haven't read any of Caro's multi-part series (including
Master of the Senate) chronicling the rise of Lyndon Johnson, do it. Just do it.
(
The Passage of Power is
coming in May. I'm going to fucking hyperventilate.)